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Multinational companies play a very large role in international trade.
Not only is there a substantial amount of arm’s-length trade between
MNCs and unaﬃliated buyers, but trade within MNCs is also quite con-
siderable. For instance, in 1994, this intraﬁrm trade accounted for approxi-
mately 36 percent of U.S. exports and 43 percent of U.S. imports. These
fractions vary somewhat from year to year, but intraﬁrm trade has been a
similarly large share of international trade since 1977.1
Recently, researchers have devoted some attention to examining how
intraﬁrm trade may be diﬀerent from arm’s-length trade.2 One essential
reason intraﬁrm trade may diﬀer from nonintraﬁrm trade results from the
fact that MNCs may alter their transactions in order to minimize world-
wide tax burdens. It has long been recognized, for example, that ﬁrms may
employ transfer pricing techniques that allow them to shift proﬁts to low-
tax locations, thus lowering their overall tax burdens. The empirical evi-
dence indicates that such motivations are not just a theoretical possibility.
Using data on the operations of U.S. parent companies and their foreign
aﬃliates, this paper examines the extent to which tax-minimizing behavior
Kimberly A. Clausing is assistant professor of economics at Reed College.
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1. The earliest year for which comparable data are available is 1977. See Zeile (1997) for
additional information regarding trends in intraﬁrm trade.
2. For example, Rangan and Lawrence (1999) examine the response of U.S. MNCs to
exchange rate ﬂuctuations. In addition, a large literature (Blomstro ¨m, Lipsey, and Kulchycky
1988; Lipsey and Weiss 1981, 1984; Grubert and Mutti 1991; Clausing 2000; etc.) considers
the relationship between trade and multinational activity.
173inﬂuences intraﬁrm trade patterns. The results indicate that taxes have a
substantial inﬂuence on intraﬁrm trade ﬂows. First, controlling for other
factors that are likely to inﬂuence intraﬁrm trade balances, the data indi-
cate that the United States has less favorable intraﬁrm trade balances with
low-tax countries. This result is anticipated if U.S. sales to aﬃliates in low-
tax countries are underpriced and U.S. purchases from aﬃliates in low-tax
countries are overpriced. Second, additional evidence indicates that trade
between U.S. aﬃliates in diﬀerent foreign countries is also likely inﬂuenced
by tax considerations. Sales by aﬃliates based in low-tax countries are
greater than one would otherwise expect relative to sales by aﬃliates based
in high-tax countries.
These results have several interesting implications. First, they indicate
an important way in which intraﬁrm trade ﬂows may indeed be diﬀerent
from international trade conducted at arm’s length. Intraﬁrm trade ﬂows
are inﬂuenced by the tax minimization strategies of MNCs. Second, the
results add evidence that transfer prices are inﬂuenced by tax considera-
tions. Much of the previous literature has considered this question by fo-
cusing on ﬁrm proﬁtabilities or tax liabilities; this paper shows how the
actual transactions between countries are aﬀected by transfer pricing strat-
egies.
Section 7.2 will discuss the relationship between the tax minimization
strategies of MNCs and intraﬁrm trade. It will review the previous theoret-
ical and empirical literature in this area, and generate a simple model that
demonstrates the relationship between taxes and intraﬁrm trade. Section
7.3 will consider the data on intraﬁrm trade between U.S. parents and their
aﬃliates abroad, examining speciﬁcations that relate such intraﬁrm trade
to the tax rates faced by aﬃliates in diﬀerent countries. Section 7.4 consid-
ers the data on intraﬁrm trade between diﬀerent foreign aﬃliates of U.S.
ﬁrms, examining both the impact of transfer pricing on intraﬁrm trade
and the potential impact of the subpart F provisions of U.S. tax law on
intraﬁrm trade. Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 The Impact of Tax Minimization Strategies on Intraﬁrm Trade
Multinational ﬁrms can typically lower their overall tax burdens by
shifting proﬁts toward low-tax countries and away from high-tax countries.
Horst (1971) generated a simple model that shows how MNCs choose
transfer prices in order to maximize their after-tax earnings. The model
analyzes the choices of a monopolistic ﬁrm selling in two countries simul-
taneously. The ﬁrm’s earnings are equal to its after-tax proﬁts in the two
countries plus a term that shows the impact of intraﬁrm trade. This gener-
ates a situation in which a ﬁrm chooses either the lowest or highest transfer
price possible, depending on a comparison of the relative diﬀerential in tax
rates between the importing and exporting countries with the tariﬀ rate.
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pricing can aﬀect intraﬁrm trade. Kant (1990, 1995) has elaborated on
these insights, considering the likely impact of transfer pricing on intraﬁrm
trade and government revenues. The 1990 model incorporates transfer
pricing penalties and partial ownership. Transfer pricing penalties imply
that there is a trade-oﬀ between the optimal transfer price and the proba-
bility of a penalty, leading to a solution in which the price is set closer to
the arm’s-length price than would be optimal from a proﬁt perspective.
Partial ownership implies that ﬁrms may be encouraged to shift proﬁts
home, ceteris paribus, because ﬁrms may own only a part of aﬃliates.
Kant (1995) broadens the model to consider the impact of deferral of non-
repatriated foreign proﬁts on intraﬁrm trade, and ﬁnds that both deferral
and partial ownership can lead to situations in which intraﬁrm trade is
perverse, such that intraﬁrm exports originate in the country with the
higher marginal cost.
Many empirical studies (such as Lall 1973; Jenkins and Wright 1975;
Kopits 1976; Bernard and Weiner 1990; Grubert and Mutti 1991; Harris,
Morck, Slemrod, and Yeung 1993; Hines and Rice 1994; and Collins,
Kemsley, and Lang 1996) have estimated the magnitude of tax-induced
transfer pricing. Due to data limitations, the evidence is necessarily indi-
rect, but most studies indicate that transfer prices are likely to be inﬂu-
enced by tax considerations. Many studies focus on the proﬁtability of
aﬃliates in diﬀerent countries. Jenkins and Wright (1975) examine the
proﬁtability of U.S. oil companies, ﬁnding that aﬃliates in low–tax rate
countries are more proﬁtable. Grubert and Mutti (1991) ﬁnd that high
taxes reduce after-tax proﬁtabilities of local operations. Hines and Rice
(1994) ﬁnd even larger eﬀects, suggesting that 1 percent tax rate diﬀerences
are associated with 2.3 percent diﬀerences in before-tax proﬁtability.
Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1996) study the relationship between proﬁt
margins of U.S. MNCs and foreign tax rates, ﬁnding evidence of tax-
motivated income shifting, particularly income shifting into the United
States from high-tax countries. Harris et al. (1993) consider U.S. tax liabili-
ties, ﬁnding that U.S. MNCs with tax haven aﬃliates have signiﬁcantly
lower tax liabilities than would otherwise be expected. Finally, Kemsley
(1997) ﬁnds a positive relationship between a ﬁrm’s propensity to serve
(unaﬃliated) customers by exporting (relative to foreign production) and
the foreign tax rate, due to special export tax rules (IRC § 863[b]) that raise
the tax incentive favoring exports.
If U.S. MNCs manipulate transfer prices in order to minimize world-
wide tax burdens, then one may expect a country’s tax rate to have an
inﬂuence on the magnitudes of intraﬁrm trade ﬂows between the United
States and that country. For example, one method for shifting proﬁts be-
tween countries is to underprice goods sold to aﬃliates in low-tax coun-
tries and overprice goods sold by aﬃliates in low-tax countries, following
The Impact of Transfer Pricing on Intraﬁrm Trade 175the opposite pattern for transactions with aﬃliates in high-tax countries.
Such a strategy would suggest that intraﬁrm trade ﬂows to (from) low-tax
country aﬃliates should be low (high) relative to intraﬁrm trade ﬂows to
(from) high-tax country aﬃliates, ceteris paribus. On net, these tax consid-
erations imply that U.S. intraﬁrm trade balances should be more favorable
with high-tax countries than with low-tax countries.
Following Horst (1971) and Kant (1995), one can produce a simple
model that generates this prediction. Consider an MNC with some degree
of market power that is operating in two countries. It produces and sells
in each country, and also exports part of its output from the home country
(1) to the aﬃliate abroad (2).3 For now, assume that the aﬃliate is fully
owned.4
Proﬁt functions for operations in the two countries are given by the fol-
lowing equations:
(1) ( ) ( 11 11 1 =− + + Rs Cs m p m ),
(2) ( ) ( 22 22 2 =− − − Rs Cs m p m ),
where 1 is proﬁt in the home country, which depends on revenues R1 that
are a function of sales (s1) and costs (C1) that are a function of production.
Production includes both those goods sold at home and those sent to the
aﬃliate abroad (m). The output that is exported to the aﬃliates abroad is
given the transfer price p.
Consider the case in which tax rates at home are greater than tax rates
abroad (t1  t2) and deferral is allowed. Let f represent the fraction of
proﬁts that are repatriated. The eﬀective tax rate (te) on income earned in
the aﬃliate country is then
(3) tt t t f
e
22 12 =+− () .
The net proﬁt function for the ﬁrm’s global operations is
(4)   =− +− ()() . 11 11 2 2 tt
e
To illustrate how the ﬁrm may choose a transfer price in order to maximize
these net proﬁts, consider the derivative of equation (4) with respect to the
transfer price p.
(5) p
e tm t m =− −− ()( ) 11 12
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3. It is straightforward to extend this model to consider trade that originates in the aﬃliate
country. One can also consider this trade to be in intermediate products without aﬀecting
the basic insights developed here.
4. The implications of relaxing this assumption are considered in Kant (1995) and brieﬂy
discussed later.Substituting for t e
2 using equation (3) and rearranging,
(6) p tt f m =− − − () ( ) . 12 1
So, if t1  t2, the previous expression is negative, and the ﬁrm’s net proﬁts
decrease with the transfer price. Thus, ﬁrms have an incentive to un-
derprice goods sold to low-tax countries in order to shift proﬁts to low-tax
locations. Similarly, one can show that ﬁrms have an incentive to overprice
goods sold to high-tax aﬃliates when t2  t1.5
This analysis implies that ﬁrms will want to charge the lowest transfer
price possible when t1  t2. As Kant (1990) reminds us, however, two con-
siderations may interfere with this motivation. First of all, a ﬁrm may be
subject to penalties if its manipulation of transfer prices is too ﬂagrant. If
the probability of receiving a penalty increases as the transfer price is
further from the arm’s-length price, the ﬁrm will likely choose a transfer
price that balances the gain from proﬁt shifting with the possibility of a
penalty.6 Second, aﬃliates may not be wholly owned. This creates a second
proﬁt-shifting incentive, as a ﬁrm may choose to overprice shipments to
aﬃliates to transfer proﬁts to sources that are wholly owned and away
from partially owned sources.7
The tax minimization incentives demonstrated previously generate simi-
lar predictions regarding intraﬁrm trade among diﬀerent foreign aﬃliates
of U.S. ﬁrms. One would expect, ceteris paribus, aﬃliates from low-tax
countries to have higher sales to other foreign aﬃliates than do aﬃliates
from high-tax countries. However, the incentives here are slightly more
complicated. Under the subpart F provisions of U.S. tax law, U.S. ﬁrms
are not eligible to defer taxation on unrepatriated foreign income that is
derived from sales of goods between related parties where the goods are
both manufactured outside the base country and sold for use outside the
base country.8 Basically, this provision implies that trade between foreign
aﬃliates will be discouraged if such trade generates subpart F income and
if aﬃliates ﬁnd deferral a clear advantage. Aﬃliates that are located in
low-tax countries are more likely to ﬁnd deferral advantageous, ceteris pa-
ribus. Thus, subpart F acts as a second eﬀect on trade between diﬀerent
foreign aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms that may act to oﬀset the proﬁt-shifting in-
centives discussed previously.
5. Note that these models implicitly assume that there is only one transfer price p; that is,
ﬁrms keep just one set of books. Firms in reality may keep more than one set of books, using
one set of prices to minimize tax liabilities and other sets of prices for other purposes, such
as determining the relative performance of aﬃliates.
6. This consideration alters the degree of transfer price manipulation, but would not alter
the desired direction of underpricing or overpricing.
7. While this consideration may inﬂuence the desired direction of transfer price changes,
it also assumes that ﬁrms are free to manipulate transfer prices without the need to be re-
sponsive to the proﬁts of their minority interests.
8. See Rapakko (1990) for a detailed description of these provisions.
The Impact of Transfer Pricing on Intraﬁrm Trade 1777.3 Intraﬁrm Trade between U.S. Parents and Aﬃliates
Using data on intraﬁrm trade ﬂows from the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA) surveys of U.S. direct investment abroad, this paper attempts
to clarify the impact of tax-minimizing behavior on intraﬁrm trade ﬂows.
The analysis employs country-level data, because tax rates vary primarily
by country (rather than by industry). It is possible to consider these rela-
tionships both across countries and over time because BEA surveys are
available on an annual basis between 1982 and 1994. In this section, the
analysis will focus on intraﬁrm trade ﬂows between U.S. parents and their
aﬃliates abroad, as illustrated in ﬁgure 7.1. In the following section, the
analysis will turn to intraﬁrm trade between diﬀerent foreign aﬃliates of
U.S. ﬁrms.
The basic speciﬁcation explains intraﬁrm trade ﬂows as a function of
tax rates and other exogenous variables that are likely to aﬀe c tt r a d eﬂ o w s .
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Fig. 7.1 Two approaches to analyzing the relationship between transfer pricing
and intraﬁrm tradeTable 7.1 deﬁnes and summarizes the variables used in the analysis. The
dependent variable is the intraﬁrm trade balance between the United
States and the country hosting U.S. aﬃliates. The intraﬁrm trade balance
is the amount of U.S. exports sent from parent ﬁrms to their aﬃliates
abroad minus the amount of U.S. imports sent from aﬃliates to U.S. par-
ents, relative to the total amount of trade between the U.S. parents and
aﬃliates.
The tax rate variable used is an eﬀective tax rate (ETR): foreign income
taxes paid relative to income. Although using marginal tax rates is a theo-
retically superior alternative, the published marginal tax rates are an im-
Table 7.1 Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable N Mean Deviation
Intraﬁrm trade balance 524 .2627 .4843
Eﬀective tax rate 651 .3450 .2231
Real exchange rate 612 133.1 47.75
Income growth 605 3.395 4.091
Share of sales in wholesale trade 583 .1976 .1479
Share of sales in manufacturing 629 .3841 .2481
Overall trade balance 635 .0649 .3200
Unaﬃliated trade balance 561 .2932 .5291
Sales to aﬃliates in other foreign
countries 589 2,530 5,149
Sales to nonaﬃliates in other
foreign countries 595 2,292 4,317
Total sales 651 19,171 35,543
Note: The data cover the period 1982–94. Fifty-eight countries are included. Each observa-
tion represents one country (i) and one year (t). “Intraﬁrm trade balance” is the amount of
U . S .e x p o r t ss e n tf r o mp a r e n tﬁ r m st oU . S .a ﬃliates in country i minus the amount of U.S.
imports sent from U.S. aﬃliates in country i to U.S. parents, relative to the total amount of
trade between U.S. parents and their aﬃliates in country i.“ E ﬀective tax rate” is foreign
income taxes paid relative to income. “Real exchange rate” is an index where 1980  100,
calculated using nominal exchange rates and price indexes in the United States and country
i. “Income growth” is the growth in real GDP for country i in year t. “Share of sales in
wholesale trade/manufacturing” are shares of total sales that are in wholesale trade/manufac-
turing. “Overall trade balance” is total U.S. exports to country i minus total U.S. imports
from country i, relative to total trade between the United States and country i (excluding
intraﬁrm trade between parents and aﬃliates in country i). “Unaﬃliated trade balance” is
U.S. exports by unaﬃliated persons to aﬃliates in country i minus U.S. imports sent from
U.S. aﬃliates in country i to unaﬃliated persons in the United States, relative to the total
trade between unaﬃliated persons in the United States and aﬃliates in country i. “Sales to
aﬃliates in other foreign countries” are sales by aﬃliates in country i to aﬃliates in other
foreign countries. “Sales to nonaﬃliates in other foreign countries” are sales by aﬃliates in
country i to unaﬃliated persons in other foreign countries. “Total sales” are the total sales
in all locations by aﬃliates in country i. Real exchange rate and income growth data come
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics yearbooks. Overall
trade data come from the U.S. International Trade Commission. All other data come from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis annual surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
The Impact of Transfer Pricing on Intraﬁrm Trade 179perfect proxy for the actual tax rates ﬁrms face, because such rates do not
account for the many subtleties (tax holidays, ad hoc arrangements, etc.)
that determine the true tax treatment of ﬁrms.9
This basic speciﬁcation oﬀers a starting point for examining the inﬂu-
ence of taxes on trade patterns between the United States and host coun-
tries. If host-country taxes are low, and ﬁrms systematically employ trans-
fer pricing to shift proﬁts to low-tax countries, one would expect U.S.
intraﬁrm trade balances to be less favorable with such countries because
intraﬁrm exports from the United States are underpriced and intraﬁrm
imports into the United States are overpriced. Thus, if taxes aﬀect trade
patterns in the manner previously hypothesized, the expected sign of 1
is positive.
The speciﬁcation also includes other variables that are likely to aﬀect
intraﬁrm trade ﬂows. These variables fall into three categories. First of all,
I include two variables that reﬂect bilateral economic conditions: (1) the
strength of the dollar relative to the aﬃliate country currency, measured by
therealexchangeratebetweenthetwocountries,and(2)theincomegrowth
ofthe aﬃliate country—one expects the United States to have more favor-
able trade balances when income growth abroad is relatively strong.10
In the second category, I include variables that reﬂect the character of
aﬃliate operations in the host country. Countries where aﬃliate activities
are primarily concentrated in wholesale trade may have substantially
diﬀerent trade patterns with the United States than do countries where
aﬃliate activities are concentrated in manufacturing, ﬁnance, petroleum,
or service industries. ShareWhit is the share of aﬃliate sales in country i
(and year t) that are in the wholesale trade industry; ShareMit is the share
of aﬃliate sales that are in manufacturing industries. Dummy variables are
also included in some speciﬁcations for countries that may have unique
intraﬁrm trade relationships.11
In the third category I include other types of trade balances between the
United States and the country in question. I include the total (excluding
intraﬁrm trade) trade balance between the two countries, as a possible
control for other factors that may inﬂuence the pattern of trade between
the two countries. I also include the trade balance between aﬃliates
abroad and nonaﬃliated persons in the United States, as a possible control
for characteristics of aﬃliates that may inﬂuence their trade with the
United States.
Results are shown in table 7.2. The basic speciﬁcation just described is
9. In addition, the average tax rates for this sample (of ﬁfty-eight countries and thirteen
years) are more readily available.
10. Most empirical studies of trade ﬂows have utilized such variables because there are
strong theoretical rationales for including them; see Deardorﬀ (1998).
11. I include dummies for Japan and for the European countries as a group in some speci-
ﬁcations.
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an eﬀective tax rate in the aﬃliate country 10 percentage points higher is
associated with an intraﬁrm trade balance relative to country i that is 4.4
percentage points greater. The ﬁtted values from these regression results
imply that the United States would have an intraﬁrm trade balance of 0.26
with a country that had an eﬀective tax rate at the mean (0.33). Holding
the other variables constant, the results suggest that the intraﬁrm trade
balance with a country with an eﬀective tax rate in the 10th percentile
would be 0.14, whereas the intraﬁrm trade balance with a country with an
eﬀective tax rate in the 90th percentile would be 0.39.
Most of the other coeﬃcients in the regression were approximately as
expected. The real exchange rate coeﬃcient indicates that as the dollar is
stronger, intraﬁrm trade balances improve.12 This contradicts one’s expec-
12. When exchange rate lags were included, they were not statistically signiﬁcant, nor did
they improve the ﬁt of the regression or noticeably change the other coeﬃcients of interest.
Therefore, they are not included for the results presented here.
7.1 note.
Table 7.2 Dependent Variable: Intraﬁrm Trade Balance
Independent
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Eﬀective tax rate .4353 .5179 .4226
(.0956) (.0967) (.1090)
Real exchange rate .0013 .0009 .0011
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Income growth .0058 .0090 .0095
(.0046) (.0047) (.0050)
Share of sales in wholesale trade 1.179 1.506 1.236
(0.154) (.141) (0.167)
Share of sales in manufacturing .1913 .2496 .2892
(.0830) (.0832) (.0873)
Overall trade balance .8607 .8367 .8999
(.0644) (.0649) (.0685)
Unaﬃliated trade balance .0231 .0566 .0201
(.0346) (.0349) (.0363)
European country dummy .1660 .1445
(.0400) (.0416)
Japan dummy .4292 .4385
(.1071) (.1060)
Constant .3580 .3548 .3392
(.0884) (.0909) (.0965)
N 449 449 397
Adjusted R2 .425 .392 .447
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) include all country/year pairs
for which data are available. Column (3) excludes those countries deﬁned as tax havens,
where the eﬀective tax rate is less than 10 percent. For variable deﬁnitions refer to table
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dollar is depreciated. On the other hand, if intraﬁrm trade quantities are
relatively ﬁxed or slow to change, than intraﬁrm trade balances may actu-
ally improve in dollar terms when the dollar is appreciated, due to
J-curve–type eﬀects. Income growth abroad does not have a statistically
discernible impact on intraﬁrm trade balances.
Both the share of sales in wholesale trade and the share of sales in manu-
facturing are positively associated with intraﬁrm trade balances, with the
share of sales in wholesale trade having a particularly large eﬀect. For
instance, if aﬃliates in country i have a 10 percent higher share of their to-
tal sales in wholesale trade, one can expect the United States to have intra-
ﬁrm trade balances with country i that are 12 percentage points greater.
The United States tends to have more favorable intraﬁrm trade balances
with European countries and Japan. Column (2) shows the same speciﬁ-
cation as column (1), excluding these dummy variables. This speciﬁcation
indicates that the inclusion of these variables does not aﬀect most other
coeﬃcients in a statistically discernible fashion.
There is a strong and statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship be-
tween the U.S. overall trade balance (excluding intraﬁrm trade) with a
country and the intraﬁrm trade balance. This is perhaps due to common
country-speciﬁc factors that aﬀect both types of trade balances, including
the relative savings/investment balance in the two countries.13 The relation-
ship between the intraﬁrm trade balance and the trade balance between
aﬃliates in country i and unaﬃliated U.S. persons is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant.
Column (3) tests the basic speciﬁcation, excluding countries that are
deﬁned as tax havens. For simplicity, I deﬁne tax havens to be those coun-
tries where the eﬀective tax rate is less than 10 percent.14 The results from
this speciﬁcation indicate that the tax eﬀects shown are not dependent
solely on those countries in the sample with the lowest tax rates.
However, it is the case that the tax sensitivity of intraﬁrm trade is driven
by those countries in the sample whose eﬀective tax rates are less than the
U.S. tax rate. In particular, if one divides the sample into two groups of
observations based on whether the eﬀective tax rate is lower or higher than
the U.S. marginal tax rate, one ﬁnds that the relationship between taxes
and intraﬁrm trade is much more dramatic for the low-tax group. Results
are shown in table 7.3.15
13. Countries that save more than they invest run global trade surpluses, whereas those
that invest more than they save run deﬁcits. These global deﬁcits and surpluses are likely to
inﬂuence levels of bilateral deﬁcits and surpluses.
14. This deﬁnition follows that of Grubert and Mutti (1996).
15. One can also break down the sample to see if the tax eﬀects remain the same for rich
and poor countries. I broke down the sample into high-income countries (those with per
capita incomes greater than $9,000) and other countries. The coeﬃcients on the eﬀective tax
variable were statistically indistinguishable from each other in the two regressions.
I also tried speciﬁcations that looked at an inverse tax rate (equal to 1/(.1  ETR), follow-
182 Kimberly A. ClausingOne advantage of considering these speciﬁcations in the context of a
panel data set is that this allows a closer inspection of the inﬂuence of
taxes on intraﬁrm trade both across countries and over time. It is also
easier to consider how the relationships shown in the regressions of table
7.2 change due to particular events. One very important change that oc-
curred during this time period was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
1986). Many important changes in tax law aﬀected MNCs at this time;
perhaps the most important, TRA 1986 reduced the marginal corporate
income tax rate from 46 to 34 percent. As Grubert, Randolph, and Rous-
slang (1996) point out, this was likely to increase the number of ﬁrms in
excess credit position, giving ﬁrms a greater incentive to lower foreign
taxes. These types of eﬀects would indicate more income-shifting activity
after 1986. However, Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang note that the
share of ﬁrms with excess credits did not increase post-1986. This could
Table 7.3 Dependent Variable: Intraﬁrm Trade Balance
Independent ETR  U.S. Rate ETR  U.S. Rate
Variables (1) (2)
Eﬀective tax rate .8772 .0230
(.1770) (.2005)
Real exchange rate .0028 .0003
(.0004) (.0005)
Income growth .0027 .0049
(.0053) (.0076)
Share of sales in wholesale trade .7163 1.657
(.1849) (.2758)
Share of sales in manufacturing .2042 .2920
(.1148) (.1161)
Overall trade balance .5776 1.107
(.0762) (.1068)
Unaﬃliated trade balance .0472 .1030
(.0413) (.0532)







Adjusted R2 .474 .570
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is divided into two subsets based on a
comparison of the average eﬀective tax rate (ETR) with the U.S. marginal tax rate. For vari-
able deﬁnitions refer to table 7.1 note.
The Impact of Transfer Pricing on Intraﬁrm Trade 183
ing Grubert and Mutti 1996) to test the hypothesis that there may be magniﬁed sensitivity
to low tax rates. In my speciﬁcations, however, I did not ﬁnd that this variable improved the
explanatory power of the regression, nor did it appear to be more statistically signiﬁcant
than the more conventional tax variable.have been due to income shifting itself, but was also likely due to the fact
that average foreign tax rates were falling during this time period, sug-
gesting that there would be decreased incentives for income shifting.
Table 7.4 breaks down the sample into two time periods before and after
TRA 1986. Although the 95 percent conﬁdence interval for the eﬀective
tax rate variable coeﬃcient overlaps, the point estimate for this coeﬃcient
is much higher in the earlier subperiod. This result may be due to the lesser
dispersion of eﬀective tax rates across countries in the later subperiod. In
particular, the variation of the eﬀective tax rate variable is smaller during
the later time period. The mean of this variable is closer to the U.S. mar-
ginal tax rate during the later period as well.
Finally, the greater number of observations available using a panel of
data improves the degrees of freedom, enabling more precise estimates of
the coeﬃcients. One might question, however, whether the overall tax
eﬀects are still discernible in individual cross sections. Table 7.5 shows
estimates of the coeﬃcients on the eﬀective tax rate variable for the indi-
vidual cross sections between 1982 and 1994. Of the thirteen years of cross
sections, twelve of the coeﬃcients on the eﬀective tax rate variable are
positive. Although only one of the coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant at
Table 7.4 Dependent Variable: Intraﬁrm Trade Balance
Independent 1986 and Before After 1986
Variables (1) (2)
Eﬀective tax rate .6977 .3031
(.1652) (.1204)
Real exchange rate .0016 .0007
(.0007) (.0004)
Income growth .0080 .0144
(.0074) (.0059)
Share of sales in wholesale trade 1.872 .9053
(.0301) (.1823)
Share of sales in manufacturing .5378 .0103
(.1380) (.1055)
Overall trade balance .7945 .8601
(.1122) (.0813)
Unaﬃliated trade balance .0260 .0431
(.0683) (.0404)
European country dummy .1365 .1395
(.0661) (.0507)





Adjusted R2 .501 .408
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For variable deﬁnitions refer to table 7.1 note.
184 Kimberly A. Clausinga 95 percent conﬁdence level, ten are statistically positive with greater than
70 percent conﬁdence. These ten coeﬃcients are estimated between 0.38
and 1.1, implying tax eﬀects of a similar magnitude to those found in the
panel regression.
7.4 Intraﬁrm Trade between Foreign Aﬃliates of U.S. Firms
Analyzing intraﬁrm trade patterns between diﬀerent foreign aﬃliates of
U.S. ﬁrms may be more complicated due to the combined inﬂuence of two
eﬀects: the incentive to shift proﬁts to low-tax countries, and the incentive
to avoid subpart F income in low-tax countries. Because the available
trade data do not distinguish between the type of trade that triggers sub-
part F income and other trade, the inﬂuence of tax-minimizing incentives
on intraﬁrm trade between foreign aﬃliates may be more diﬃcult to iso-
late.
I consider a speciﬁcation that explains sales from aﬃliates in a given
Table 7.5 Tax Coeﬃcient Estimates for Cross Sections, 1982–1994



























Note: The dependent variable is intraﬁrm trade balance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The Impact of Transfer Pricing on Intraﬁrm Trade 185host country to other foreign aﬃliates as a function of tax rates and other
variables that are likely to aﬀect these trade ﬂows.






















The dependent variable is the sales of aﬃliates in country i (during year
t)t oa ﬃliates in other foreign countries. This variable is no longer a trade
balance because we do not have data on purchases of aﬃliates of a given
host country from other foreign aﬃliates. (See ﬁg. 7.1 for an illustration.)
In addition, the data used are sales data rather than trade ﬂows.16 These
data diﬀer from trade data in several respects, the most important of which
is that sales data include services as well as goods.17
In this regression, if income-shifting eﬀects predominate, we would ex-
pect the coeﬃcient1 to be negative, indicating that aﬃliates based in low-
tax countries overprice their sales to aﬃliates in other countries in order
to shift income to low-tax locations. If subpart F provisions are very im-
portant, on the other hand, one might expect sales to other foreign aﬃli-
ates to be lower for aﬃliates based in low-tax countries because such
aﬃliates would want to avoid generating subpart F income.
Many of the independent variables are deﬁned as in the previous anal-
ysis. A few changes are noteworthy, however. First, it is no longer meaning-
ful to include a variable measuring economic growth in country i because
we are trying to explain sales to foreign countries other than country i.18
Second, the control variables are deﬁned to be analogous to the dependent
variable. In particular, total sales by aﬃliates in country i (minus sales to
other foreign aﬃliates) are included to proxy for inﬂuences that increase
overall sales by aﬃliates in a given country. Sales to nonaﬃliates in other
16. Trade data are not available. Also, trade data are calculated on a shipped basis, which
usually requires ﬁrms to use shipping department invoices rather than accounting data.
17. One can take a similar approach to the previous speciﬁcations too, of course, in which
case one would be explaining sales from aﬃliates in country i to U.S. parents as a function
of the standard independent variables, in addition to total sales by aﬃliates in country i
and sales by aﬃliates in country i to nonaﬃliates in the United States. Results from such a
speciﬁcation are shown in appendix table 7A.1. A tax rate 1 percentage point higher is associ-
ated with 0.36 percentage points fewer sales to the parent. (The elasticity of parent sales with
respect to (1  ETR) is 0.72; at the mean taxes/income ratio, this corresponds to an elasticity
with respect to the ETR of 0.36.)
18. Dummy variables continue to be appropriate. For example, aﬃliates in European coun-
tries may be particularly likely to sell to aﬃliates in other countries due to their close geo-
graphical proximity to other European countries.
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may make them more likely to ship goods to other countries. Third, a
speciﬁcation in natural logs is considered. Because both the dependent
variables and the control variables are no longer in percentage terms, such
a speciﬁcation makes the results easier to interpret.
Table 7.6 shows the results. In column (1), the coeﬃcient on the eﬀective
tax variable suggests that a 1 percent increase in the eﬀective tax rate in
country i is associated with a 0.82 percent reduction in sales to other for-
eign aﬃliates.19 Sales to other foreign aﬃliates are positively related to the
share of total sales in manufacturing in country i, the total sales of aﬃliates
in country i (excluding sales to other foreign aﬃliates), and the sales by
aﬃliates in country i to nonaﬃliates in other foreign countries. Aﬃliates
19. The coeﬃcient in the table indicates an elasticity of other country aﬃliated sales with
respect to 1  ETR of 1.65. At the mean ETR, this corresponds to an elasticity with respect
to the ETR of 0.82.
Table 7.6 Dependent Variable: Sales to Aﬃliates in Other Foreign Countries
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
1  eﬀective tax rate 1.648 .8934 1.870
(.286) (.2987) (.316)
Real exchange rate .0432 .1374 .0704
(.1464) (.1574) (.1484)
1  share of sales in wholesale trade .1859 1.608 .4159
(.4268) (.414) (.4675)
1  share of sales in manufacturing 1.507 2.185 1.353
(.259) (.263) (.278)
Total sales .4569 .3617 .4374
(.0654) (.0667) (.0683)
Sales to nonaﬃliates in other foreign .4606 .6403 .4484
countries (.0507) (.0480) (.0526)
European country dummy 1.126 1.192
(.307) (.130)
Japan dummy 1.286 1.423
(.307) (.306)
Year .0207 .0119 .0247
(.0126) (.0137) (.0130)
Constant 2.288 2.288 3.268
(1.419) (1.541) (1.463)
N 480 480 421
Adjusted R2 .789 .751 .794
Note: All variables are in natural logs with the exception of dummy variables and year. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) include all country/year pairs for which
data are available. Column (3) excludes those countries deﬁned as tax havens, where the
eﬀective tax rate is less than 10 percent. “Sales to aﬃliates in other foreign countries” are
sales by aﬃliates in country i to aﬃliates in other foreign countries. For other variable deﬁni-
tions refer to table 7.1 note.
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these dummy variables are excluded in column (2), the point estimate of
the coeﬃcient on the eﬀective tax rate is smaller and, as one might expect,
the coeﬃcient on the share of sales in wholesale trade becomes much more
important and statistically signiﬁcant.20 Column (3) excludes from the
sample those countries with eﬀective tax rates less than 10 percent that are
deﬁned to be tax havens. Excluding tax havens has little eﬀect on the re-
sults, so the demonstrated tax sensitivity is unlikely to be primarily a result
of operations in very low tax countries.
There are several ways to interpret the tax coeﬃcient results. It is pos-
sible that these results indicate tax-induced income shifting. Aﬃliates
based in low-tax countries overprice their sales to other foreign aﬃliates in
order to shift income from high-tax sources to low-tax sources. Although
subpart F encourages aﬃliates in low-tax countries to avoid the type of
sales to other aﬃliates that generates subpart F income, this inﬂuence is
not apparent in the results, perhaps due to the fact that many types of
trade do not generate subpart F income.
It is also possible that the tax coeﬃcient result does not indicate tax-
induced income shifting, but rather reﬂects the fact that low-tax locations
are more attractive places to invest, and hence generate more trading activ-
ity of all types. One might hope that including the total level of sales in
such countries as an independent variable would capture some of this in-
ﬂ u e n c e ,b u ti tm a yn o tb ea d e q u a t e .
Another approach to this question would be to consider as a dependent
variable the share of total sales that destined for aﬃliates in other coun-
tries. Figure 7.2 shows how total sales are typically divided between
diﬀerent destinations in the sample. If aﬃliates are attempting to shift in-
come to low-tax locations, one would expect that aﬃliates in low-tax coun-
tries would see higher shares of their total sales going toward aﬃliates in
other countries, relative to aﬃliates based in high-tax locations. Although
there is no incentive to alter prices on local sales or sales to nonaﬃliates,
aﬃliates in low-tax countries have an incentive to overprice aﬃliate sales,
whereas aﬃliates in high-tax countries have an incentive to underprice
aﬃliate sales. Table 7.7 shows the results of these speciﬁcations. The esti-
mates from column (1) indicate that an eﬀective tax rate 1 percentage point
higher in country i is associated with a 0.26 percentage point lower share
of sales that are destined for aﬃliates in other foreign countries. Figure 7.3
shows a graphical representation of this negative relationship between the
eﬀective tax rate of the aﬃliate country and the share of total sales that is
destined for aﬃliates in other countries.
20. Aﬃliates based in European countries have an average of 29 percent of their total sales
in wholesale trade, and aﬃliates based in Japan have an average of 26 percent of their sales
in wholesale trade. Aﬃliates based in other countries average only 14 percent of their total
sales in wholesale trade.
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of sales destined for parents in the United States. Column (2) considers
this hypothesis. However, the coeﬃcient on the eﬀective tax rate is not
estimated precisely, and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Col-
umn (3) looks at the relationship between eﬀective tax rates in country i
Table 7.7 Equations Estimating the Share of Total Sales That Are to Aﬃliates
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Eﬀective tax rate .2603 .0093 .3181
(.0182) (.0295) (.0331)
Real exchange rate .0001 .0000 .0005
(.0001) (.0000) (.0001)
Income growth .0023 .0017 .0024
(.0009) (.0015) (.0017)
Share of sales in wholesale trade .1807 .2333 .3281
(.0302) (.0501) (.0555)
Share of sales in manufacturing .0663 .1547 .0010
(.0163) (.0262) (.0297)
European country dummy .1380 .0716 .0615
(.0078) (.0130) (.0141)
Japan dummy .0587 .0716 .0188
(.0212) (.0353) (.0383)
Constant .1355 .2230 .4062
(.0171) (.0283) (.0321)
N 477 484 467
Adjusted R2 .536 .210 .231
Note: Dependent variables are shares of total sales to aﬃliates in other foreign countries
(column [1]), to aﬃliates (parents) in the United States (column [2]), and to aﬃliates both in
the United States and in other foreign countries (column [3]). Standard errors are in paren-
theses. For other variable deﬁnitions see table 7.1 note.
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Fig. 7.2 The distribution of total sales to aﬃliates and nonaﬃliates in the United
States, locally, and in other countriesand the combined share of sales to all other aﬃliates, both those in other
foreign countries and parent ﬁrms in the United States. Here the coeﬃcient
on the eﬀective tax rate implies thata1p e r c e n t a g epoint increase in the
eﬀective tax rate in country i is associated with a 0.32 percentage point
reduction in the share of sales to aﬃliates.21
These results provide evidence that the tax minimization strategies of
MNCs may inﬂuence intraﬁrm trade. There is also a piece of indirect evi-
dence regarding the eﬀects of subpart F. Although concerns over trig-
gering subpart F income do not appear to reduce sales from aﬃliates in
low-tax countries to other aﬃliates, it is the case that aﬃliates operating
in countries where a large share of sales are in wholesale trade have a lower
share of sales to aﬃliates in other countries. Subpart F income is more
likely when trade is in wholesale products, because subpart F income is
generated only when trade between aﬃliates is in goods that are both man-
ufactured outside the country of origin and sold for ﬁnal use outside the
country of origin. Thus, although subpart F may not substantially reduce
most types of trade by aﬃliates in low-tax countries, it may reduce whole-
s a l et r a d eb ys u c ha ﬃliates.
7.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of tax-minimizing behavior on intraﬁrm
trade patterns. Using data on the operations of U.S. parent companies
and their foreign aﬃliates between 1982 and 1994, the paper examines the
relationship between the eﬀective tax rates faced by U.S. aﬃliates in
diﬀerent countries and intraﬁrm trade both between U.S. parents and their
21. Again, one can divide the sample into two subsets based on whether the ETR is lower
or higher than the U.S. marginal tax rate. Results, shown in appendix tables 7A.2 and 7A.3
conﬁrm the previous conclusion that the relationship between taxes and intraﬁrm trade is
much stronger for low-tax countries.
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Fig. 7.3 The share of total sales destined for aﬃliates in other countriesaﬃliates abroad and between diﬀerent foreign aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms. The
results indicatea clearrelationship between taxesand intraﬁrmtrade ﬂows.
First, controlling for other factors that are likely to inﬂuence intraﬁrm
trade balances, the data indicate that the United States has less favorable
intraﬁrm trade balances with low-tax countries. This result ﬁts with the
theoretical expectation that ﬁrms minimizing their worldwide tax burdens
will underprice U.S. exports to aﬃliates in low-tax countries and overprice
U.S. imports from aﬃliates in low-tax countries. An eﬀective tax rate in
the aﬃliate country 10 percentage points lower is associated with an in-
traﬁrm trade balance relative to that country that is 4.4 percentage
points smaller.
Second, additional evidence indicates that trade between U.S. aﬃliates
in diﬀerent foreign countries is also likely inﬂuenced by tax considerations.
Sales by aﬃliates based in low-tax countries to aﬃliates in other countries
are greater than one would otherwise expect. In addition, the share of
aﬃliates’ total sales that are destined for other aﬃliates is negatively re-
lated to the eﬀective tax rate of the aﬃliate country. These results, along
with the previous ones, provide evidence that tax-minimizing motivations
may be inﬂuencing intraﬁrm trade patterns.
These results have several noteworthy implications. First, they indicate
an important way in which intraﬁrm trade may be diﬀerent from interna-
tional trade conducted at arm’s length. Intraﬁrm trade ﬂows are inﬂuenced
by the tax minimization strategies of MNCs. As Kant (1995) demon-
strates, this tax-minimizing behavior can lead to situations in which in-
traﬁrm trade is perverse, such that intraﬁrm exports originate in the coun-
try with the higher marginal cost.
Second, the results add more evidence to the body of literature that
has measured the magnitude of tax-induced transfer pricing. Much of the
previous literature has found evidence of transfer price manipulation by
focusing on the relationship between the taxes faced by aﬃliates located
in diﬀerent countries and ﬁrm proﬁtabilities or U.S. tax liabilities. This
paper adds evidence showing a clear relationship between the taxes faced
by aﬃliates abroad and their intraﬁrm trade transactions.
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Table 7A.1 Dependent Variable: Sales to U.S. Parents
Independent Variables
1-eﬀective tax rate .7224
(.2979)
1-share of sales in wholesale trade 2.700
(.495)




Sales to nonaﬃliates in the United States .1607
(.0425)








Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Sales to U.S. parents” are sales by aﬃliates in
country i to U.S. parent companies. “Sales to nonaﬃliates in the United States are sales by
aﬃliates in country i to nonaﬃliated persons in the United States. Other variables are deﬁned
as in table 7.1. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of dummy variables.
Table 7A.2 Low Eﬀective Tax Rate Sample
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Eﬀective tax rate .4607 .1693 .6300
(.0405) (.0419) (.0600)
Real exchange rate .0001 .0007 .0006
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
Income growth .0021 .0011 .0027
(.0013) (.0013) (.0019)
Share of sales in wholesale trade .1933 .0452 .2388
(.0418) (.0439) (.0625)
Share of sales in manufacturing .1127 .0212 .1371
(.0273) (.0284) (.0404)
European country dummy .1540 .0990 .0556
(.0113) (.0117) (.0167)
Constant .1594 .2575 .4169
(.0237) (.0252) (.0362)
N 293 293 288
Adjusted R2 .545 .379 .362
Note: Dependent variables are shares of total sales to aﬃliates in other foreign countries
(column [1]), to aﬃliates (parents) in the United States (column [2]), and to aﬃliates both in
the United States and in other foreign countries (column [3]). Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Sample includes only those observations for which the eﬀective tax rate is less than
the U.S. marginal tax rate. For other variable deﬁnitions refer to table 7.1 note.
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In this study, Clausing provides evidence that corporate tax incentives ma-
terially inﬂuence intraﬁrm trade balances. In particular, she ﬁnds a posi-
Deen Kemsley is associate professor of accounting at Columbia University.
194 Kimberly A. Clausingtive relation between U.S. MNCs’ intraﬁrm trade balances (i.e., dollar-
denominated exports less imports) and country-speciﬁc tax rates, which
is consistent with the predicted eﬀects of tax-induced transfer pricing.
She also ﬁnds that patterns of sales among MNC aﬃliates in diﬀerent for-
eign countries are consistent with tax-induced transfer pricing. Hence,
Clausing extends the frontiers of empirical tax transfer pricing research to
two new domains: trade balances and sales patterns among foreign aﬃl-
iates.
This extension does not come without cost, for trade balances and sales
patterns not only are functions of transfer pricing, but also are functions of
international investment and production location decisions. As Clausing
recognizes, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between transfer pricing and invest-
ment location explanations for the empirical results, so she includes some
controls for investment location. Nevertheless, future research is still re-
quired to distinguish between the two explanations, and to examine the
relative magnitude of transfer pricing versus investment location eﬀects.
My discussion of the paper proceeds as follows. I ﬁrst analyze the rela-
tion between taxes and U.S.-foreign intraﬁrm trade balances. Next, I ex-
amine taxes and intraﬁrm trade among foreign aﬃliates of U.S. MNCs.
Finally, I oﬀer concluding remarks.
Taxes and Intraﬁrm Trade between U.S. Parents and Aﬃliates
United States MNCs have a tax incentive to shift taxable income away
from high-tax foreign aﬃliates to the United States, and to shift taxable
income from the United States to low-tax aﬃliates. Using a variety of
diﬀerent approaches, several prior studies have provided evidence that U.S.
ﬁrms pursue both of these income-shifting strategies (e.g., Grubert and
Mutti 1991, Harris, Morck, Slemrod, and Yeung 1993, and Collins, Kem-
sley, and Lang 1998). As long recognized, however, the U.S. foreign tax
credit system mitigates this income-shifting incentive for ﬁrms without
enough credits to oﬀset the entire U.S. tax on foreign source income. For
example, if a deﬁcit-credit ﬁrm shifts taxable income from the United
States to a low-tax country, the ﬁrm must recapture the taxable income in
the United States upon repatriation of the shifted proﬁts. As a result, shift-
ing income across jurisdictions often provides only temporary tax sav-
ings—but even temporary savings provide some incentive for ﬁrms to
shift proﬁts.1
1. Clausing accounts for repatriation policies in her income-shifting model by letting f
represent the fraction of proﬁts repatriated to the United States. Because repatriation triggers
the U.S. tax on the income of low-tax aﬃliates, income-shifting incentives decrease in f and
go to 0 when f equals 1. In practice, ﬁrms’ repatriation policies typically change over time,
so f is a complex function of several factors. For example, if ﬁrms eventually repatriate all
foreign proﬁts to the United States, and if the after-local-tax rates of return are the same in
the foreign country as they are in the United States, then shifting income to the low-tax
jurisdiction does not provide any net tax savings for a ﬁrm because the magnitude of the
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fer prices. For example, a U.S. MNC selling goods to a low-tax foreign
aﬃliate can shift taxable income away from the United States by under-
charging the low-tax aﬃliate for the goods. Undercharging the aﬃliate for
the goods would reduce reportable exports to the aﬃliate, decreasing the
intraﬁrm trade balance. On the other hand, the ﬁrm would have an incen-
tive to reduce taxable income for high-tax aﬃliates by overcharging them
for goods, which would increase reportable exports and intraﬁrm trade
balances. All else being equal, therefore, tax-induced transfer pricing is
expected to result in a positive relation between intraﬁrm trade balances
and country-speciﬁc tax rates. Consistent with this expectation, Clausing
reports a positive estimated coeﬃcient for the eﬀective tax rate variable in
table 7.2.
In addition to transfer pricing incentives, MNCs have a tax incentive
to locate production facilities and other investment in low-tax countries.
Grubert and Mutti (1996) provide evidence that ﬁrms respond to this in-
centive. Placing production in low-tax countries instead of the United
States could reduce reportable exports to the aﬃliates relative to imports
from the aﬃliates, decreasing intraﬁrm trade balances with the low-tax
countries.2 Similarly, MNCs have an incentive to shift production from
high-tax countries to the United States, and U.S. export tax incentive rules
magnify this incentive.3 Kemsley (1998) provides evidence that ﬁrms re-
spond to this tax incentive by exporting goods to high-tax countries, which
would increase intraﬁrm trade balances. Like tax-induced transfer pricing,
therefore, tax-induced investment location decisions generally are ex-
pected to result in a positive relation between intraﬁrm trade balances and
country-speciﬁc tax rates.
A natural question, therefore, is whether the positive estimated coeﬃ-
cient for the eﬀective tax rate (ETR) in table 7.2 captures transfer pricing
eﬀects, investment location eﬀects, or both.4 Here, Clausing provides some
support for the transfer pricing interpretation by controlling for the “over-
all” and “unaﬃliated” U.S. trade balances with each foreign country. After
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eventual U.S. repatriation tax grows at the discount rate (Scholes and Wolfson 1992). Within
Clausing’s model, these strict assumptions would imply that f equals 1 for deﬁcit-credit ﬁrms,
even if the current rate of repatriation is less than 1.
2. Placing production in low-tax countries could very well increase overall intraﬁrm activ-
ity with low-tax aﬃliates, both exports and imports. However, if the goods produced in low-
tax countries are targeted for U.S. customers, imports from the low-tax aﬃliates typically
would exceed exports to the aﬃliates.
3. Under IRC § 863(b), MNCs can treat half of their export proﬁts as foreign source
income. Hence export proﬁts raise foreign tax credit limitations, allowing ﬁrms to use other-
wise wasted excess foreign tax credits.
4. Unlike Grubert and Mutti (1996) and Kemsley (1998), Clausing uses each country’s
eﬀective tax rate as an explanatory variable instead of using each country’s marginal statu-
tory tax rate. Both measures likely are subject to considerable measurement error, and it is
not clear whether empirical results are sensitive to the choice of tax variable.including these controls, the ETR coeﬃcient reﬂects a unique relation be-
tween tax rates and intraﬁrm trade balances, which is where we expect
to ﬁnd transfer pricing eﬀects. However, tax-induced production location
decisions also may have an especially strong inﬂuence on intraﬁrm trade
balances, as ﬁrms choose to produce goods in low-tax countries and ship
the goods to sales aﬃliates in high-tax countries.5 Hence it is unclear
whether transfer pricing or investment location decisions drive the results
presented in table 7.2.
Similarly, table 7.3 does not uniquely support transfer pricing eﬀects,
and it raises new questions. The evidence in this table indicates that the
positive relation between ETRs and intraﬁrm trade balances is solely con-
centrated among countries with low tax rates. However, the tax incentive
to shift taxable income away from high-tax countries to the United States
increases in the foreign tax rate, and consistent with this incentive, Collins
et al. (1998) provide evidence that ﬁrms shift a substantial amount of in-
come to the United States. Indeed, the tax incentive to transfer price in-
come from high-tax countries to the United States is less ambiguous than
the incentive to shift income to low-tax countries, because ﬁrms must pay
the diﬀerence between U.S. and low foreign tax rates upon repatriation of
the shifted proﬁts to the United States.6 From a transfer pricing perspec-
tive, therefore, it is unclear why the estimated tax eﬀect exists only among
low-tax countries.
Table 7.4 indicates that tax eﬀects were greater before 1988 than after
this date. Again, it is diﬃcult to interpret this ﬁnding in terms of tax incen-
tives. Firms with excess foreign tax credits derive permanent tax savings
from transfer pricing income to lower-taxed jurisdictions, whereas ﬁrms
with deﬁcit foreign tax credits only defer taxes until repatriation. The per-
centage of ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits increased substantially
when the United States reduced corporate tax rates with the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, so tax transfer pricing (and investment location) incentives
are greater in the latter period, not weaker as suggested by table 7.4.7 On
5. Using ﬁrm-level evidence, Kemsley (1998) ﬁnds that tax incentives induce U.S. MNCs
to increase exports to unaﬃliated foreign customers (given data constraints, I do not examine
the inﬂuence of taxes on intraﬁrm exports). This ﬁnding suggests that the relation between
taxes and production location is not unique to intraﬁrm settings, which provides some sup-
port for a transfer pricing interpretation of Clausing’s results. However, Clausing’s unaﬃlia-
ted trade balance control variable captures only exports from unaﬃliated U.S. ﬁrms to the
aﬃliates of U.S. MNCs, so it is an imperfect (but potentially helpful) control for the tax-
induced exports from U.S. MNCs to unaﬃliated entities captured by Kemsley.
6. The ﬁnding by Collins, Hand, and Shackelford (chap. 6, this volume) that investors
capitalize future repatriation taxes into share prices further limits the incentive to shift tax-
able income to low-tax countries.
7. As Clausing points out, variation in the ETR variable is relatively small during the latter
time period, which could contribute to the weak results. Outliers also could contribute to the
weak results after 1988, for, as reported in table 7.5, the estimated ETR coeﬃcient is positive
in all years except 1993, and the study does not provide any sensitivity tests to determine
whether outliers account for the negative coeﬃcient in this year.
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tions against transfer price manipulation in recent years, which may con-
tribute to the relatively weak results after 1988.
Taxes and Intraﬁrm Trade among Foreign Aﬃliates
In a second set of tests, Clausing examines the hypothesis that sales
among foreign aﬃliates are negatively related to the tax rates of the coun-
tries where the sales originate. That is, she examines whether low-tax for-
eign aﬃliates tend to sell more goods to high-tax aﬃliates than they buy
from high-tax aﬃliates. Consistent with this hypothesis, she ﬁnds a nega-
tive relation (as reported in tables 7.6 and 7.7).
Again, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between transfer pricing and invest-
ment location explanations for this result. On the one hand, transfer pric-
ing income from high-tax aﬃliates to low-tax aﬃliates would increase (de-
crease) the reported sales of the low-tax (high-tax) aﬃliates. As Clausing
notes, however, producing goods in low-tax countries and shipping the
goods to high-tax aﬃliates also would result in high (low) reported sales
for the low-tax (high-tax) aﬃliates. Therefore, she includes two control
variables for the investment location explanation, sales to nonaﬃliates in
other countries and total sales. These variables may generally help control
for tax-induced investment location decisions, but they are not speciﬁc
enough to eﬀectively rule out the possibility that ﬁrms are merely produc-
ing goods in low-tax countries for shipment to their high-tax aﬃliates.
Conclusion
In summary, therefore, Clausing provides rather convincing evidence
that taxes inﬂuence the intraﬁrm trade patterns of U.S. MNCs, but the
evidence does not clearly distinguish between transfer pricing and invest-
ment location explanations for this ﬁnding. I do not believe this ambiguity
detracts from the paper’s central message that taxes inﬂuence trade bal-
ances. Instead, the paper has the potential to stimulate a substantial
amount of future research in this area.
Key unanswered questions for future consideration include the follow-
ing. What are the relative magnitudes of the inﬂuences of tax-induced
transfer pricing versus tax-induced investment location strategies on in-
traﬁrm trade balances? What are the relative magnitudes of tax-induced
income shifting into versus out of the United States? What are the ﬁrm-
and industry-level determinants of ﬁrms’ choices among various income
shifting and investment location strategies? Have MNCs’ preferred tax-
planning strategies changed over time, and if so, why? I believe that an-
swering these types of questions would provide us with a much more com-
plete understanding of the links between taxes and multinational business
practices than we can acquire by continuing to document diﬀerent multi-
national tax strategies in isolation from each other.
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